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 guish carefully between true and continuing cultural and local-political vitality, and ac-
 tual geopolitical power.
 A. M. Eckstein
 Department of History
 University of Maryland
 Margaret Graver (trans.), Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago:
 University of Chicago Press, 2002), 254 pp.
 Those who know Margaret Graver's other work will not be surprised by the high
 quality of scholarship in this translation and commentary on Tusculan Disputations Books
 3 and 4. Nonetheless the volume will be of interest and accessible to the uninitiated as
 well as the specialist, being suitable for use in upper-level undergraduate courses or
 graduate seminars on philosophical psychology.
 Graver gives us a smooth translation that is close to the Latin, sometimes emending
 the Latin text printed by Pohlenz (see xli) or in the Loeb, and typically offering good rea-
 sons for doing so (see especially 181 on Tusculans 4.78). Her commentary, which consti-
 tutes the bulk of the book, regularly attends to technical Latin terms and their Greek
 equivalents, providing informed speculation or correction when the meaning of a term is
 questionably or inconsistently maintained by Cicero (see e.g. 153-4 on proclivitas, 135 on
 the partes of the soul, and 79, 149 and 157 on morbus and aegrotatio).
 The volume has something for scholars in all fields associated with Classics-thus
 history and literature as well as philosophy and lexicology. Graver situates the Tusculans
 at the end of a development in Cicero's attitude toward emotions by comparison with On
 the Orator and the letters (xii, 168), and suggests social as well as intellectual reasons for
 his later taking the Stoic line (xii-xiii). She reconstructs the six months following his
 daughter Tullia's death so as to place both the Tusculans and the non-extant Consolation
 within Cicero's personal history (xiii-xiv, 187), and her attention to literary genre, style
 and figures of speech brings to light connections with the Greek philosophical, dramatic,
 and consolatory traditions (e.g. xv, xxvii-xxx, 142).
 Much of the commentary is philosophical in orientation, and Graver is careful to
 elucidate the context by outlining the Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Stoic views as
 known to us from other sources. She thus provides interesting portions of the Stoic
 theory not reported by Cicero (such as the list of species-eupatheiai, 138, and the Stoic
 and Epicurean accounts of eros, 174-6) as well as the breadth needed to evaluate Ci-
 cero's presentation of the Stoics (e.g. he does not represent the orthodox position
 when calling the object of an emotion 'fresh'; it is the belief which is regularly identi-
 fied as such in Stoic definitions [119]). In addition to the Stoics' cognitivist account of
 emotions ('emotions are reducible to judgments'), important topics treated include
 Stoic epistemology, theory of action, position on value, and conception of nature. The
 generally clear presentation of these will be of particular use to students, though
 philosophers specializing in later periods should also find them helpful since, for ex-
 ample, the Stoic account of "starting points" or "seeds of the virtues" (aphormai; 77) is
 important background for Augustine's and Aquinas' theory of natural law (see e.g. ST
 I 79.12 obj. 3, citing Aug. On Free Choice 2.10), and the distinction between normative
 'nature' and descriptive 'nature' (see Graver xvi, 73, 75) was developed by patristic
 philosophers into the theory of 'original nature' vs. 'fallen nature' (compare e.g. Au-
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 gustine, Expositions of the Psalms 30.2.13 and Confessions 8.9.21-22, 8.11.26 to Seneca On
 Anger 2.10.2, 2.10.6, 2.13.1).' Graver is also attentive to current philosophical presup-
 positions, and to analytic concerns generally. Thus she addresses the contemporary
 tendency to think that emotions simply are chemical or electrical changes of the body
 (rather than, as the Stoics had it, changes in the soul) (140), and raises objections to the
 Stoic account which Cicero himself did not raise (e.g. 172).
 Nevertheless, there is one important area in which Graver's presentation could be
 stronger: the criterion of truth in Stoic theory. The fact is that the Stoics held a 'correspon-
 dence theory of truth': true beliefs are those that match up to reality, which is indepen-
 dent of our minds. These have as a supervenient property consonance with one another;
 since the universe is one harmonious whole, accurate propositions about reality are not
 contradictory. While Graver's account does sometimes acknowledge this twofold em-
 phasis on soundness and validity (135, 136), she does not explain that the former is pri-
 mary for the Stoics. More alarmingly, soundness often drops out of the picture entirely.
 Thus 'coherence' alone becomes the criterion. We hear, for instance, that "goodness is de-
 fined..,. with reference to the internal coherence of some system .... What is good ought
 to be that which fits into some pattern which is orderly and complete relative to that per-
 son" (xxi; see also 92, 154-5), that virtue or knowledge is simply "logical coherence
 among all one's beliefs" (87; cf. 86), that vice is lack of consistency within one's belief-set
 (148-9), and that Right Reason is the maintenance of order and consistency among the
 mind's judgments (141). Statements like these ring of Kant2 or of post-Cartesian philoso-
 phy more generally; as such they are themselves strangely discordant notes in this piece
 of otherwise solid scholarship. She cites Diogenes Laertius 7.126, Sextus Empiricus Ad-
 versus Mathematicos 8.275-6, and Stobaeus Eclogues 2.7.5b5 in support (86, 87); these texts
 make reference to virtue as knowledge, to reason's capacity for logical sequence, and to
 the unity of the virtues, but they do not offer substantive support for her presentation of
 t e criterion.
 Only occasionally does this misinterpretation slightly color the translation; for 4.23's
 pravarum opinionum conturbatio et ipsarum inter se repugnantia Graver has "the confusion of
 crooked opinions and the conflict of one with another" in place of the Loeb's "corrupt be-
 liefs warring against one another." While she is closer to the Latin in phraseology, her
 rendering of "pravus" as "crooked" can be faulted as overly literal, and suggestive of a
 merely formal problem with the beliefs (i.e. beliefs which merely clash with others one
 holds) rather than anything intrinsically wrong with their content. Here the Loeb seems
 preferable for its use of the extended sense, "corrupt."
 Pace Tieleman, her discussion of possible sources for Cicero is far from superficial;3 she
 demonstrates close familiarity with relevant texts and philosophical currents in the four ap-
 pendices and in observations throughout the commentary. Graver is generally a sensitive
 reader with thorough knowledge of the historical periods; consequently we get interesting
 suggestions: a discrepancy between 4.21 and otherwise similar material in Diogenes Laer-
 1. For other currents contributing to this development, see N. J. Torchia, Plotinus, Tolma, and the
 Descent of Being, American University Studies: Series V, Philosophy, 135 (New York: Peter
 Lang, 1993), 11-17.
 2. Compare Graver 117 to Kant's justification for perfect duties to self at Grounding of the Meta-
 physics of Morals 422.
 3. See T. Tieleman, Chrysippus' On Affections, Philosophia Antiqua 94 (Leiden/Boston: Brill,
 2003), 9 n. 20.
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 tius suggests an error by a copyist of the latter (147); comparison of the ps-Plutarchan Conso-
 lation to Apollonius with the Tusculans and with other Stoic texts indicates use of Crantor by
 not only Cicero and the author to Apollonius but also perhaps the early Stoics themselves
 (188-9); assessment of Cicero's list of species-passions in light of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laer-
 tius, and ps-Andronicus indicates that he is drawing on a compilation not used by the later
 Greeks, perhaps that of Sphaerus (144); and Aristotle and Cicero's Stoic source may have
 shared use of an earlier text (143). Her conclusion that Chrysippus is the direct source for
 much of Cicero's (and Posidonius') work echoes that of Dougan-Henry4 (75-6, 112, Appen-
 dix C-D). In support of it, we are given at one point a detailed list of themes and attitudes
 found in Cicero which Galen and others associate specifically with Chrysippus (204ff). The
 list is discerning, if not entirely persuasive. One may still wonder, for instance, why Cicero
 frequently says that according to the Stoics, the intentional object of an emotion is a "great
 good or evil" (magnum bonum/malum, 3.24-5, 3.28, 3.61, 4.22), even though "great" does not
 occur in the passages she presents from Galen, Calcidius, and Diogenes Laertius represent-
 ing Chrysippus; herein we find merely "goods" or "a fine thing." Nonetheless, Cicero does
 occasionally say the object is simply "a good" or "an evil" (3.24, 3.74).
 The volume is also useful as a starting point for further research on topics treated
 therein. Each segment of the commentary provides page numbers to some of the relevant
 secondary work on the specific topics discussed, and Graver usually notes where her pre-
 sentation agrees with or diverges from the authors she mentions. A few more references
 to other notable works would have been a nice addition here (or at least to the final bibli-
 ography), as these lists tend to repeat standard works and authors. One thinks, for in-
 stance, of the work of Rist on the question of Platonic 'parts' of the soul5 or on Seneca and
 his sources,6 and the studies on propatheiai by Stevens' and Layton.8
 In sum, although not without some room for improvement, this volume is generally
 of very high quality, and ought to be lauded as a valuable contribution to philosophical
 psychology and classical studies.
 Sarah Byers
 Department of Philosophy
 Ave Maria University, Naples, FL
 4. M. Tulli Ciceronis Tusculanarum Disputationum Libri Quinque, vols. I and II, edd. T. W. Dougan
 and R. M. Henry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905 and 1934, repr. New York:
 Arno Press, 1979), II, xlii and xlvii, respectively.
 5. J. Rist, "Plato Says That We Have Tripartite Souls ... " in: Sophies Maietores. Chercheurs de
 Sagesse, edd. M.-O. Goulet-Caze et al. (Paris: Institut des ttudes Augustiniennes, 1992), 103-
 124.
 6. J. Rist, "Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy," Aufstieg und Niedergang der Romischen Welt/Rise and De-
 cline of the Roman World (ANRW) II 36.3, ed. W. Haase (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter,
 1989), 1993-2012.
 7. J. Stevens, "Preliminary Impulse in Stoic Psychology," Ancient Philosophy, 20 (2000), 139-168.
 8. R. Layton, "Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions," Vigiliae Christianae,
 54 (2000), 262-282. Other studies too recent for inclusion in Graver's book include S. Byers,
 "Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic 'Preliminary Passions' (Propatheiai)," Journal of
 the History of Philosophy XLI (2003), 433-448 and R. Layton "Fom 'Holy Passion' to Sinful Emo-
 tion: Jerome and the Doctrine of Propassio" in: In Dominico Eloquio, edd. P. Blower et al. (Grand
 Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 280-93.
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